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13-1367-cv
Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. (SUNY) at Orange, AKA Orange Cnty. Cmty. Coll.
I n  the
United S ta te s  Court of Appeals
F o r  the Second Circuit
August Term, 2013 
No. 13-1367-cv
Ch e s t e r  Wid o m s k i,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
St a t e  Un iv e r s it y  o f  Ne w  Yo r k  (SUNY) a t  Or a n g e , AKA Or a n g e  
Co u n t y  Co m m u n i t y  Co l l e g e , 
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York. 
No. 09-cv-7517 — Kenneth M. Karas, Judge.
Su b m it t e d : Ma r c h  20, 2014 
De c i d e d : Ap r il  8, 2014
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Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York (Kenneth M. Karas, Judge). We 
hold that Appellant failed to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to 
whether Appellee perceived him as being substantially limited in 
the major life activity of working, and failed to raise a genuine 
dispute of fact as to whether Appellee's explanation for bringing 
disciplinary proceedings against him was pretext for retaliation.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
Mi c h a e l  H. Su s s m a n , Sussman & Watkins, 
Goshen, New York, for Chester Widomski.
HYUN CHIN KIM, Senior Assistant County 
Attorney, Goshen, New York, for the State 
University of New York (SUNY) at Orange, AKA 
Orange County Community College.
Pe r  Cu r i a m :
Chester Widomski appeals from the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee the State 
University of New York (SUNY) at Orange, also known as Orange 
County Community College ("OCCC"), on his claims of 
discrimination on the basis of a "perceived disability" and
- 2 -
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retaliation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
BACKGROUND
Widomski enrolled as a full-time student in OCCC's two-year 
Medical Laboratory Technology ("MLT") program in the fall of 2007 
in order to become a licensed medical laboratory technician. In fall 
2008, Widomski began the clinical portion of the program, a course 
called Clinical Training I. Widomski was assigned to the Catskill 
Regional Medical Center, where Rebecca Sander, an employee of the 
Center (and not OCCC), served as his proctor. As part of the course, 
students were required to submit weekly clinical summary reports 
signed by their proctors accompanied by weekly narratives relating 
to the work performed.
On his third day at the Center, Sander told Widomski that he 
would not be allowed to draw blood from patients because his 
hands shook too much. She expressed this view to Rosamaria
- 3 -
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Contarino, the chair of OCCC's Laboratory Technology Department, 
and Contarino agreed. Although Widomski admits that his hands 
sometimes shake when he is nervous, he denies any physical 
impairment or disability of the hands.
On October 7, 2008, Contarino met with Widomski to discuss 
the fact that Widomski had not submitted the required weekly 
summary reports and narratives. At the meeting, Contarino and 
Widomski executed an agreement providing that Widomski would 
submit the required reports and narratives by October 9, 2008, to 
avoid receiving an "F" in the course. Contarino also informed 
Widomski that he would not be permitted to participate in the 
phlebotomy portion of the course because of his shaky hands. 
Contarino informed Widomski that he remained qualified to 
graduate from the MLT program and thereafter obtain employment 
as a laboratory technician, but he would not be permitted to receive 
a MLT license that would permit him to work in a hospital or in any
- 4 -
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other setting where he would need to draw blood from patients. On 
October 8, 2008, Widomski submitted hematology and urinalysis 
summary reports to Contarino in accordance with their agreement 
of the previous day.
On October 27, 2008, Widomski's counsel sent a letter to 
Contarino asking that she allow Widomski to complete the 
phlebotomy rotation and denying that he had a disability of the 
hands.
On the same day, Contarino again reminded Widomski to 
submit outstanding summary reports. Widomski sent additional 
hematology and urinalysis forms on November 4, 2008. These forms 
were almost identical to the forms Widomski submitted on October 
8. Widomski's explanation for the similarity is that "Sander . . . 
refuse[d] to sign new forms, so [he] changed the date of his 
previously-submitted . . . forms to October 29, 2008, which is the 
date Sander filled 'yes' and 'Y' in the competency columns on each
- 5 -
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respectively." Sanders testified to the contrary that she did not write 
the "yes" and "Y" for competency.
On November 5, 2008, Contarino initiated disciplinary 
proceedings against Widomski by referring charges of document 
falsification to the Vice President of Student Services, Paul Broadie, 
II. Broadie referred the matter to a Board of Inquiry. Following a 
formal hearing before the Board of Inquiry, and its determination 
that he had falsified the documents, Widomski was expelled from 
the MLT program.
Widomski then brought this lawsuit in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The District 
Court granted summary judgment to OCCC. It concluded that 
Widomski had failed to establish that OCCC perceived his shaking 
hands to substantially limit a major life activity, and granted the 
motion for summary judgment as to the ADA discrimination claim. 
Widomski v. State Univ. of N.Y. (SUNY) at Orange, 933 F. Supp. 2d 534,
- 6-
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543-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 
490-91, 493 (1999)).
Regarding his retaliation claim, Widomski characterized the 
protected activity as his attorney's October 27, 2008, letter, and the 
retaliation as Contarino's referral of the disciplinary matter to 
Broadie. Id. at 545. The District Court concluded that Widomski 
established his prima facie case, but that Contarino's good faith 
belief that he had falsified documents was a legitimate, non­
discriminatory reason for the disciplinary referral. Id. at 549-50. 
Because Widomski had not presented any evidence that OCCC's 
"explanation [wa]s a false pretext for a retaliatory motive," the court 
granted summary judgment for OCCC on the retaliation claim as 
well. Id. at 553.
Widomski appeals.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de 
novo. Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.
- 7-
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2010). We conclude that the definition of "disability" in Section 
12102 of the ADA applies to all Titles of the ADA. We also conclude 
that the District Court properly granted summary judgment, and 
reject Widomski's arguments that genuine factual disputes exist as 
to whether OCCC perceived him as having a disability within the 
meaning of the ADA and as to whether OCCC's articulated reason 
for initiating disciplinary proceedings against him was a pretext for 
retaliation.
I. The definition of "disability" set forth in Section 12102 of
the ADA applies to all Titles of the ADA.
The District Court's holding that the definition of "disability" 
in the ADA applies to Title II of the ADA is correct. Section 12102 of 
the ADA provides that "[a]s used in this chapter," "[t]he term 
'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
- 8-
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or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(2) (2006).
The "[a]s used in this chapter" language unambiguously 
incorporates the definition of disability into all Titles of the ADA. 
Section 12102 is contained in Chapter 126 of Title 42 of the United 
States Code. Titles I through IV of the ADA are codified as 
subchapters of Chapter 126. A definition that applies to "this 
chapter" applies to that chapter's subchapters.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that the 
ADA's definition of disability applies to all Titles of the Act, and is 
not meant to be applied only to Title I: "[T]he fact that the Act's 
definition of 'disability' applies not only to Title I of the Act, which 
deals with employment, but also to the other portions of the Act, 
which deal with subjects such as public transportation and privately 
provided public accommodations demonstrates that the definition is 
intended to cover individuals with disabling impairments regardless
- 9-
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of whether the individuals have any connection to a workplace."1 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 201 (2002) 
(internal citations omitted), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). If the statute's 
text and the Supreme Court's holding leave any doubt, we have said 
that the "definition of 'disability' applies to all of the ADA." See 
Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 273 n.7 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
As the District Court noted in its opinion below, a line of cases 
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
New York holds that the definition of "disability" in Section 12102 
applies only to Title I of the ADA. See Lee v. City of Syracuse, 603 F. 
Supp. 2d 417, 441 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); Farid v. Bouey, 554 F. Supp. 2d 
301, 327 n.19 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Jones v. Fischer, No. 9:10-CV- 
1331 (GLS/ATB), 2012 WL 1899004, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2012)
1 The relevant events in this case took place prior to the effective date of the ADA  
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3353 (2008), which, among  
other things, modified the definition of a "perceived disability."
- 10-
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(adopting without comment narrower definition of "disability" from 
Farid), adopted by 2012 WL 1898947 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2012); 
Silvagnoli v. Fischer, No. 9:07-CV-561 (NAM/GJD), 2010 WL 1063849, 
at *16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (same), adopted by 2010 WL 1063840 
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010). The District Court rejected the suggestion 
that the definition of disability applies only to Title I of the ADA, as 
do we.
II. Widomski failed to demonstrate that OCCC perceived him 
as having an impairment that substantially limited a major 
life activity.
To establish discrimination based on a perceived disability 
under the version of the ADA in effect during the period at issue in 
this case, a plaintiff must show that he is regarded as having an 
impairment that "substantially limits" a major life activity. See 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (2008). Widomski argues that the statements and actions of 
Sander, who is not an employee of OCCC, and Contarino, the
- 11-
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Department Chair of OCCC's MLT Department, demonstrate that 
OCCC perceived him as having a shaky hands impairment that 
"substantially limits" him in the major life activity of working—in 
other words, that renders him "unable to work in a broad class of 
jobs." Id. at 491. Specifically, Widomski points to Sander's decision 
to prevent him from performing phlebotomy procedures during his 
clinical rotation at her medical clinic, and Contarino's support for 
Sander's decision.
There is no record evidence that Contarino or any other 
OCCC employee believed that Widomski's shaky hands excluded 
him from a broad class of jobs. To the contrary, Contarino told 
Widomski that he would still be employable as a medical technician, 
and testified that many hospitals and clinics hire medical technicians 
for jobs that do not require phlebotomy. Widomski fails on this 
record to raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether OCCC
- 12-
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perceived him as being substantially limited in the major life activity
of working and thus as having a disability under the ADA.2
III. Widomski failed to demonstrate that OCCC's explanation 
for its decision to bring disciplinary proceedings against 
him was pretext for retaliation.
"Claims for retaliation [under the ADA] are analyzed under 
the same burden-shifting framework established for Title VII cases." 
Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002). For 
substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court's Opinion 
and Order entered March 21, 2013, we agree that Widomski has not 
produced evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against him 
was a pretext for retaliation. Contarino's good faith belief that 
Widomski fabricated two assignments constitutes a legitimate, non­
retaliatory reason for bringing a disciplinary action against him. The 
burden having shifted back to Widomski to provide competent
2 W e decline to address W idomski's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, 
that OCCC regarded him as substantially limited in the major life activity of 
learning. See Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner, 416 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).
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evidence of pretext, Widomski fails to raise a genuine factual 
dispute as to whether this explanation is false or otherwise 
pretextual. See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 
2000).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Widomski's remaining arguments and 
conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the 
judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
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